We propose and test a theory that predicts relative power for network positions. In so doing, we address several structural phenomena, including the breakdown of larger networks into smaller parts and the emergence of positions that simultaneously have one level of power in one part of the network and a different level in another. Our theory is further intended to provide higher levels of rigor, power, and specificity than are found in earlier approaches. We find that each such technical advancement produces a manifold increase in the array of potential applications.
Whenever a person or group negotiates with another person or group over the allocation of valued resources, a minimal social-exchange network exists. More elaborate (i.e., nondyadic) structures form when one member is involved in two or more such relations. For example, college students Al, Bea, and Cleo each want to date, and norms prohibit them from dating more than one person at a time. Suppose that Bea and Cleo both vie for Al's attention and have no other prospects, while Al would be happy to date either Bea or Cleo. This creates a B-A-C network, where A(1) may "negotiate" with B(ea) and C(leo), but only date one of them. Such circumstances actually do tip the balance of power (Peplau 1979 Burgess and Huston (1979) , and Cook (1987) . Emerson (1976) , Bredemeier (1978) , and Tuner (1986) have written reviews. Applications involving ethnographic, institutional, and historical analyses are provided by Polanyi (1944) , Elkin (1953) , Sahlins (1972) , Earle and Ericson (1977) , and Emerson (1981) . Recent applications of network-exchange theories to interorganizational relations, backward and forward integration of the firm, community structure, historical development of modem exchange relations, and exchange processes in antiquity are given by Hansen (1981) , Loukinen (1981) , Gilham (1981) , Galaskiewicz (1985) , Skinner and Guiltinan (1986) , Lind (1987) , and Willer (1987) .
This type of analysis is applicable in other areas such as international, auctioneer-bidder, retailer-consumer, and manufacturer-retailer relations. A good example is the control that a manufacturer may impose upon retailer marketing strategies (Skinner and Guiltinan 1986) By informally applying power-dependence ideas, Cook et al. developed several hypotheses predicting relative power for positions in several types of negatively connected networks. Toward the end of the paper, a network vulnerability (V) method was suggested as a first step toward a formal procedure for predicting positions' relative power.
To determine V for the B-A-C network, assume that related actors negotiate over the division of 24 resource points, and a one-exchange rule creates the negative connection: A may exchange with B or C but not both in a given round. First, the maximum resource flow (MRF) for the network is calculated. MRF = 24 since, by the one-exchange rule, only 24 points may be distributed per round. Next, the reduction in 2 Comparisons among these theories are hindered by their lack of explicit scope conditions. Although some scope conditions can be inferred, at times it is not clear when theories are competitors (Wagner and Berger, 1985) with divergent predictions testable in the same empirical settings. In either case, the predictions diverge from those we will obtain from our model. specifies conditions under which distal network properties will or will not influence proximal outcomes. We first present p(l), an index for power in one-exchange networks. This allows us to test our predictions against those of Cook et al. (1983 Cook et al. ( , 1986 . Following this, p(e), a generalized version, will be explicated and tested.
Conditions of Exchange
Power and resource distributions are affected not only by network shapes, but also by the conditions under which exchanges transpire. The theory provides scope statements encompassing relatively broad conditions, some of which are later relaxed, others of which await future tests, theoretical extensions, and refinements. Scope conditions are not assumptions about human nature or frequencies of empirical circumstances. They are statements that, if satisfied (or approximated), commit the theory to critical examination and, if not satisfied, relieve it of any explanatory imperative (Walker and Cohen 1985) .
Several important concepts must first be defined: actors are decision-making entities, e.g., organisms, collectivities, or even computer programs. Positions are network locations occupied by actors. A relation between two positions is an exchange opportunity for actors in those positions. In short, actors occupy positions linked by relations.4 We will index both actors and positions using uppercase letters and at times refer to them interchangeably.
Actor Conditions. Four conditions delimit actors' behavior: (1) all actors use identical strategies in negotiating exchanges; (2) actors consistently excluded from exchanges raise their offers; (3) those consistently included in exchanges lower their offers; (4) actors accept the best offer they receive, and choose randomly in deciding among tied best offers.
Condition 1, requiring identical strategies, is nearly always implicit in exchange theories. In tests and applications, however, it is generally sufficient that actors adopt functionally similar strategies. Condition 1 also asserts that actors negotiate, i.e., they make offers and adjust their subsequent offers in light of counter-offers they receive. Conditions 2 and 3 require that actors seek to enter exchange if previously denied, and to improve outcomes beyond those previously obtained. Finally 
Axioms and Theorems
The formal statement of our theory appears in the Appendix to this paper. In the statements below, "power" refers to Pij, with i and j related. 10 After a sufficiently extended series of exchanges, an actor with p = 0 should seek exchange in all of its relations, regardless of power differences. That is, to avoid complete exclusion, the actor will offer to keep just one resource unit and relinquish the balance of the pool to any other that is willing to exchange. This seems to violate Axiom 2; however, this actor is no longer engaged in negotiation. This violates the first actor condition and makes the theory inapplicable. This is hardly a limitation of the theory, however, for when exchanges reach this point of non-negotiability, the system (or subsystem) has run its course, exchange rates will remain fixed, and the theory is "finished" with its predictions for the application. complex networks to break apart into smaller, stable subnetworks. When such a break occurs, power indices are recalculated within the resulting subnetworks. This is demonstrated in some of the applications below.
Applications
We have applied the GPI, axioms, and theorems to a large number of networks of varying shape and size. This small sampling demonstrates the use of the theory. 
Method
Subjects were undergraduates at a large university. Before being taken to the laboratory, participants in a given session met as a group, received written instructions, and had any questions answered. In the research room, connections among network positions were clearly marked and, to limit collusion, temporary barriers separated positions among which exchange was prohibited. The setting minimally restricted the availability of information about the structure and the actions of others. 12 Twenty-four counters were placed between related positions. These served as resources to be divided by mutual agreement, each valued at one profit point and worth 3 cents. Each position was limited to one agreement per round. Before starting, we emphasized that exchanges could only occur by mutual agreement between related positions, and long-term strategies were prohibited.
Experiments were organized by rounds, periods, and sessions. In all, five sessions were run, each with a different group of subjects. There were five periods per session, allowing each subject to occupy each position for one period before the session was over. Each period contained four negotiation rounds, each with a three-minute time limit. Each position's scores were announced after every round. At the close of a session, participants were paid according to points they obtainedaround $5.00 on the average. This design produced a total of 100 rounds of negotiation.
Hypotheses
Below we present hypotheses derived from our theory, those obtained from Cook et al.'s (1986) DN procedure, and the null hypotheses.
1. Our theory predicts that the network will break at the B-D relation, eliminating ex- 2. B will exercise power over A and C, so B will receive more points per exchange than A and C. The DN hypothesis also predicts B > (A,C). The null hypothesis predicts no difference in the point accumulations of B, A, and C.
3. The GPI indicates that D and E have equal power, and so should have a 12-12 division of points. DN predicts that D will obtain higher profits than E. Our prediction can be falsified either by D > E, as DN predicts, or by E > D.
4. E's profits will exceed those of A and C since E is in an equipower dyad and the others are low-power positions. The DN and null hypotheses predict no profit differences among E, A, and C.
Results
In 100 negotiation rounds across five sessions, only three exchanges occurred between B and D. 13 The difference between this number and the null hypothesis of 16.667 was assessed with the z-test for proportions. The result, z = 3.666, p < .0003, supports Hypothesis 1 and refutes the null hypothesis. Table 1 shows the average number of points per session for each position. B clearly obtained favorable exchange rates, above 19-5 in all but one session. The t-tests show that in every session, B's mean profits were significantly above 12 (and, by necessity, A's and C's significantly below). The null hypothesis is rejected and Hypothesis 2 and the DN prediction are supported. Table 1 shows that the mean D-E exchange rates for each session differed only slightly from the 12-12 split; t-tests indicate that none of these differences was statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is also confirmed and the DN hypotheses rejected.
As for Hypothesis 4, the mean point total for position E was 12.12, A's was 4.81, and C's was 4.91. Combining session means for the latter two positions and testing against E's scores, t = 7.522, p < .0005. Hypothesis 4 is supported and the null and DN hypotheses refuted.
In sum, this study provided strong support for the p(l) measure as tested against its null hypotheses and the revised vulnerability measure. In the next section we present p(e), a generalization for multi-exchange networks, that is, networks in which actors exchange more than once per round.
DOMAINS OF POWER AND MULTI-EXCHANGE NETWORKS

Identifying Domains
The concept of domain simplifies GPI calculations in multi-exchange networks. Domains are independent subnetworks -independent in the sense that structural changes in one cannot affect power in another.
First, let e be the maximum number of unique exchanges that positions can make in a given round. Two exchanges are unique for i only if they involve different relations. To identify domains we will need to distinguish 
Method
Procedures for this experiment were similar to those used in Experiment 1. In this case, however, each subject negotiated from the different network positions under both oneexchange and two-exchange conditions, controlling for any personal characteristics of subjects that might confound the test.
Instructions for the one-and two-exchange conditions were identical, save for the number of exchanges allowed per round. In the two-exchange condition only, D and E could exchange with up to two different partners in the same round.
Four groups were run. Each group had seven subjects, one for each of the seven network positions. Two of the groups had the one-exchange condition first, followed by the two-exchange condition. The other two groups had the order of conditions reversed. As in the previous experiment, each subject occupied each network position over a series of four negotiation rounds. The design produced a total of 224 negotiations, 112 under each exchange condition.
After completing both parts of the experiment, subjects were paid according to the number of points they had accumulated, around $7.00 on average.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses apply to the Figure  5 networks. All are tested against the null hypotheses that every relation would average 12-12 divisions.
1. In the one-exchange condition, the Es will exercise power over the Fs and D, and so the Es will all receive higher point totals than the others.
2. In the two-exchange condition, only D will exercise power. D will obtain higher point accumulations than the Es.
3. In the two-exchange condition, Es exchange in two domains. In the power domain, they will receive unfavorable profit divisions with D. In their respective dyadic domains, they will receive 12-12 divisions with the Fs. Figure 6a show the mean number of profit points obtained by each position under the one-exchange condition. The position labels for Figure 5a are Table 2b shows, the 12-12 split was approximated. None of the differences were significant. Hypothesis 3 is also supported. In sum, this experiment provided strong support for the hypotheses testing the GPI generalization to multi-exchange networks. The presence of domains within the larger network under the two-exchange conditions strongly influenced the exchanges transpiring within those domains. As far as we know, such phenomena are not anticipated by alternative network-exchange theories.
Results
Table 2a and
NEW THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS
In addition to making its predictions more precise, the formality of our theory has made it easier to develop extensions. We briefly note five that are in varying stages of development and corroboration. 
M-Exchange Networks
Flow-Networks
So far, we have focused on exchange conditions under which resources cannot transfer across relations. We have done so primarily because this is the condition under which most of the relevant research was conducted. However, as others have indicated (Marsden 1983; Bonacich 1987a) , it is worthwhile to relax this restriction and consider networks with transferable resources-those in which resources may flow through positions.
A consequence of extending into the realm of flow-networks is that positions may have power over others to which they are not related, depending on the initial distributions of resources and on which actors seek which resources. This is similar to Marsden's view. The foremost difference between that view and our approach is that we incorporate explicit assumptions about individual negotiation strategies and the conditions of exchange-factors that affect exchange outcomes, breaks, and domains.
Positive Connection
While negative connections place an upper limit on the number of exchanges in which a "hub" position may engage per round, positive connections place a lower limit on the number of exchanges in which the position must engage to realize a profit (Patton 1986 ). An example is the manufacturer who must obtain all components for a synthetic product before that product becomes a viable source of revenue. New research shows that the exchange dynamics that occur in positive connections differ markedly from those in negatively connected networks, and power advantages belong to peripheral positions in branches such as B-A-C ). This work on positive connections only begins to uncover a range of phenomena at least as broad and interesting as those associated with negative connections.
CONCLUSION
Our findings indicate that by only focusing on the effects of networks per se, alternative network theories do not recognize that power and resource distributions depend as much on prevailing exchange conditions as they do on configurations of positions and relations. We introduced a model that considers both structural form and exchange conditions, anticipating and explaining such phenomena as relative power, network breakage, power reversals and domain-specific effects. The studies that we described are only the first of many that could investigate stability and instability in exchange networks.
Future developments aside, we have found the present incarnation of the theory quite useful for understanding many real-world power struggles in exchange networks-from international disputes over geographical control to toddlers' negotiations over the sharing of playthings. Whatever the application, the theory directs us to specify the relevant actors and resources, identify other pertinent relations in which the actors are engaged, observe who seeks exchange with whom, identify which actors risk exclusion from valued resources, consider temporal constraints such as ultimatums or deadlines that create exchange rounds and, in general, determine the extent to which the exemplar departs from the idealized scope conditions of the theory.
Our work also has implications for two very general questions that are relevant to structural approaches: (1) what is the appropriate unit of analysis for structural theories; and (2) how are characteristics of structures and the social units within them mutually determined?
Regarding the first question, we eschew the designation of one unit of analysis as, in general, more or less appropriate than another. Our theory explains certain actor and network behaviors. In any given instance, the network may be an organization, as may the actor. It follows that actors may or may not be individual persons. All that matters is that the units considered have the necessary properties. Therefore, no unit of analysis is generally most appropriate for structural approaches.
We can offer no universal solution to the question of how social structures and constituent units each determine properties of the other. Our approach does, however, point to excludability as a linchpin securing individual and network realms. That is, structures and exchange conditions at times bar some actors from procuring the resources they value and desire. Thus, power happens to those whose positions allow them to dodge the struggle to avoid exclusion.
As the foregoing review of extensions-inprogress implies, we do not claim that our theory is finished or unimprovable. Nor do we claim that it explains all phenomena within the purview of alternative formulations. It is, however, consistent with the findings of all previous experimental research on exchange networks. Moreover, it addresses a range of conditions and generates predictions that are either beyond the range of alternative formulations or simply contradict them, depending upon how one interprets their scope. Our long-term goal is to continue incremental extensions and systematic tests of increasingly refined network-exchange models. -Eij (14), T2
